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FOREWORD: LIMITING RAICH
by
Randy E. Barnett·

INTRODUCTION
On Monday, November 29th, 2004, at 10:30 a.m., I rose to argue the case
of Gonzales v. Raich i in the Supreme Court on behalf of Angel Raich and
Diane Monson. On Monday, June 6th, 2005, at 10:00 a.m., the Court
announced its decision. Even today it is painful to read the opinions in the case.
I am saddened for my clients, and the thousands like them, whose suffering is
alleviated by the use of cannabis for medical purposes, as recommended by
their physicians and permitted by the laws of their states, but who are
nevertheless considered criminals by the federal government. I am saddened for
the millions of voters in the ten states who enacted compassionate relief laws to
allow these seriously ill persons to obtain cannabis without becoming
criminals, at least under state law. And I am saddened for the Constitution,
which established a system of limited and enumerated powers that had been
virtually eliminated since the 1940s before being partially revived in the cases
of United States v. Lopei and United States v. Morrison. 3
My sadness was only slightly mitigated by the clear and ringing
endorsement of our position in the dissenting opinions of Justices O'Connor
(joined by the Chief Justice and by Justice Thomas) and Thomas. These stand
as testimony to the plausibility, nay the correctness, of the approach we urged
upon the Court. With their opinions in the United States Reports, none dare call
our claims frivolous, completely impractical, or inevitably doomed. When a
theory gains the support of three justices with so disparate approaches to the
Constitution, it could just as easily have gained the support of two more justices
inclined to put a commitment to federalism above a commitment to national
power. In assessing the long-term effect of this undeniable defeat for
federalism, then, we must remember that, in the history of the Supreme Court,
the future has often been presaged by cogent dissenters who later came to be
considered more principled than the majority.4
• Austin B. Fletcher Professor, Boston University School of Law. I thank Scott D. Scheule
for his research assistance.
i Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
2 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
3 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
4 See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (Curtis, l, dissenting), Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
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Nevertheless, with its decision in Raich, six justices at once dashed the
hopes of medical cannabis users and those who believe in the value of
federalism to protect individual liberty. Given this setback, what hope is left for
the principle of limited national power, so staunchly endorsed by the late-Chief
Justice Rehnquist in his opinions in Lopez and Morrison? Will the New
Federalism survive the demise of its greatest champion?5
The superb articles in this Symposium do little to raise hopes. They argue
alternatively that Lopez and Morrison never comprised a serious federalism
revival, that the doctrines announced by these cases were too unstable to have
lasted, or that little, if anything, of these cases survives the Court's ruling in
Raich. In this Foreword, I do not mean to take issue with any of these
contentions, except perhaps the last, and I urge serious students of the
Constitution to read each and every article in this issue. Instead, I intend to
describe how a future majority of the Supreme Court, once again willing to
apply the "first principles,,6 announced by the Chief Justice in Lopez and
reaffirmed in Morrison-principles that no Supreme Court in our history has
ever expressly disclaimed--can limit the Court's decision in Raich. Where
there is a will to do so, there is certainly a way.
THE WAY

In considering what is left of federalism after Raich and how a future
Court can limit the reach of the decision, we need to isolate three distinct
issues: first, the difference between "facial" and "as-applied" challenges;
second, the distinction between "economic" and "noneconomic" conduct; and,
third, the scope of the "broader regulatory scheme" doctrine.
Facial Challenges Survive Intact

In one important respect, the holdings of Lopez and Morrison survive
completely intact: a statute that is on its face entirely outside the powers of
Congress described by the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses is
unconstitutional. 7 Given that this proposition was doubted by both courts and
scholars for the more than fifty years during which the Court failed to find that
Congress had exceeded its powers--even once-this is no small matter. In this
regard, it is highly significant that the majority opinion in Raich took pains to
214 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
5 One cannot help but wonder if the Chief Justice's weakened condition may have
prevented him from forging the sort of consensus that enabled federalism to prevail in Lopez
and Morrison.
6 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552 ("We start with fIrst principles. The Constitution creates a
Federal Government of enumerated powers. ").
7 See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2231 n.3 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
("Because respondents do not challenge on its face the CSA's ban on marijuana, 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(I), 844(a), our adjudication of their as-applied challenge casts no doubt on this
Court's practice in United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison. In those cases, we
held that Congress, in enacting the statutes at issue, had exceeded its Article I powers.")
(citations omitted).
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remain, however unfaithfully, within the framework of both Lopez and
Morrison. Given what we know about the persistent resistance of the four
dissenters in those cases, we can be confident that there were not five votes to
reverse them. Distinguished though they were in this "as-applied" challenge to
the Controlled Substances Act, the cases themselves remain authority in future
facial challenges to statutes more closely resembling the Gun Free School
Zones Act and the Violence Against Women Act.
On the other hand, even facial challenges have been undermined by Raich
to the extent its treatments of the economic-noneconomic distinction and the
"broader regulatory scheme" doctrine have made it harder to sustain such
challenges. The expansive definition of economic activity could adversely
affect facial challenges, but the broader regulatory scheme doctrine was
probably always nascent, as it was mentioned in Lopez itself. 8 I comment
further on these two theories below.
What of the viability of as-applied challenges after Raich? While making
such challenges less likely to prevail, because of its expanded construction of
federal power, the Court never denies that such challenges can be brought.
Wickard v. Filburn,9 Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,!O and Katzenbach
v. McClung!! were all as-applied challenges. While Raich now joins this
unsuccessful list, in none of these cases did the Court ever deny the availability
of such a challenge. If a future Court wishes to make such challenges easier to
sustain or confronts a set of facts to which the power of Congress under the
Commerce Clause may not constitutionally be applied, Raich will provide no
precedent against so ruling.
In Raich, the government offered two arguments for why the Congress
could reach the activity in question while respecting the precedents of Lopez
and Morrison. First, they argued that the activity in question was economic in
nature and thus conformed to the distinction emphasized in Morrison. Second,
it argued that, even if the conduct at issue was noneconomic, it could still be
reached because doing so was essential to a broader regulatory scheme that
could be undercut unless the conduct was covered. In Raich, the Court
principally relied on the second of these claims, while also accepting a
significantly altered version of the first. I now turn to the future implication of
both aspects of the Court's decision.
The Larger Regulatory Scheme Doctrine

The government contended that Lopez implicitly recognized an exception
to the generalization of Morrison that limits the substantial effects doctrine to
intrastate activities that are economic in nature.!2 In Lopez, Justice Rehnquist

See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. III (1942).
10 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
II Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
12 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,611 (2000) ("[I]n those cases where we
have sustained federal regulation of intrastate activity based upon the activity's substantial
8

9
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asserted that the Gun Free School Zone Act was "not an essential part of a
larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be
undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated.,,13 From this single
statement, the government constructed an exception to the holding in Morrison
that limited the reach of Congressional power under the "substantial effects"
doctrine to intrastate economic activity. According to this proposed exception,
Congress can reach wholly intrastate noneconomic activity if doing so is an
essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity that could be undercut
unless such intrastate noneconomic activities were included in the scheme.
Although we resisted the recognition of this exception in our brief, we
argued that it was nevertheless "essential" to reach our class of activities to
enforce the CSA. 14 By oral argument, our stance had changed. In order to
defend our claim that the relevant class in our as-applied challenge was
"cannabis cultivated and used for medical purposes as authorized by state law,"
we decided to embrace rather than resist the "larger regulatory scheme"
exception. This then enabled us to contend that it was not essential to the larger
regulatory scheme of the CSA to reach the class of activities with our particular
characteristics. Not only was our class small in size as compared with the larger
market for recreational marijuana, but its potential size was confined by the
requirement that use be for medical purposes. Additionally, the fact that it was
regulated and restricted by state law effectively separated this class from the
broader illegal market. 15
In Raich, the majority accepted the existence of the "larger regulatory
scheme" exception to Morrison, though this doctrine could just as easily be
considered a fourth distinct rationale for evaluating the reach of the Commerce
and Necessary and Proper Clauses, in addition to the three identified in Lopez. 16
In other words, in addition to the "substantial effects" rationale for reaching
intrastate activity that is economic in nature per Morrison, Congress may also

effects on interstate commerce, the activity in question has been some sort of economic
endeavor. ").
13 514 U.S. at 561.
14 Brief for Respondents at 35, Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005) (No. 031454) ("Nothing in Lopez suggests that, by this single sentence, the Court was providing an
escape route by which Congress may expand its powers to reach wholly intrastate
noneconomic activity with no substantial effect on interstate commerce.").
15 Transcript of Oral Argument at 36, Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005) (No.
03-1454) ("But a limiting principle ... was identified by the Court in Lopez in which the
government is asserting that if it's an essential part of a broader regulation of economic
activity to reach this activity, then it may be reached.").
16 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59:
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce. Second,
Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may
come only from intrastate activities. Finally, Congress' commerce authority includes
the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate
commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.
(citations omitted).
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reach intrastate activity-whether economic or not-if doing so is essential to a
larger regulatory scheme that could be undercut unless the activity is reached.
Although the Court rejected our argument that it was not essential to reach
the class of activities in our case, in the future, Raich could easily be limited to
its facts. That is to say, a future court could find that, while it may have been
essential to the larger regulatory scheme constituted by the CSA to reach the
medical use of cannabis permitted by state law-especially in light of the
fungible nature of the commodity being cultivated l7-this claim may not be
true in a future case. In other words, Raich could be construed simply as having
adopted a limited "fungible goods" rationale for why it is essential to the larger
prohibition of a national market in a commodity that even the local cultivation
and possession of such a commodity also be reached.
The tougher issue for a future Court seeking to limit Raich is the level of
scrutiny to be used to make the assessment that reaching an intrastate
noneconomic activity is "essential." The majority in Raich adopted the most
deferential version of the rational basis test. This is, perhaps, the most
dangerous aspect of the Court's holding (and Justice Scalia's concurrence).
Any heightened scrutiny provided by Lopez and Morrison could be evaded by a
traditional rational basis approach to determining whether it is "essential" to
reach the intrastate activity in question.
On the other hand, in Raich, Congress did make explicit findings in the
CSA that it needed to reach all such controlled substances. All a future Court
need do to reconcile Raich with Lopez is to stress that these congressional
18
findings satisfy the heightened rationality review implicit in Lopez. This
characterization of Raich would explain why the Court spent so much effort
justifying, as opposed to merely reciting, the conclusion that Congress had
offered in its "findings."
The level of scrutiny to be afforded the conclusion that it is "essential" to a
larger regulatory scheme to reach wholly intrastate noneconomic activity is one
of the less well-theorized or defended aspects of the Court's opinion in Raich.
In essence, it simply asserted that this was the appropriate level of scrutiny, a
conclusion that seemed also to be assumed without analysis or defense by
Justice Scalia in his concurrence. If Raich has a point that is vulnerable to
future revision by the Court, this is it. It would be simple for a future Court to
declare: "But of course the determination of 'essential' cannot be solely within
the discretion of Congress to reach, lest the doctrine swallow the enumerated
powers scheme. In Raich, it really was rational to consider the intrastate
17 See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2206 (2005) ("[R]espondents are cultivating,
for home consumption, a fungible commodity for which there is an established, albeit illegal,
interstate market.").
18 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,614 (2000):
As we stated in Lopez, '''[S]imply because Congress may conclude that a particular
activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so. '"
Rather, '" [w ]hether particular operations affect interstate commerce sufficiently to
come under the constitutional power of Congress to regulate them is ultimately a
judicial rather than a legislative question, and can be settled finally only by this Court. ",
(citations omitted).
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possession and cultivation of cannabis to be essential to the larger regulatory
scheme." Such a reinterpretation of Raich would be especially warranted given
that the term "essential" suggests a higher standard than Marshall's
interpretation of "necessary" in McCul/och.19
The Economic-Noneconomic Distinction

In Lopez, the Court noted that the activity in question-possessing a gun
within one thousand feet of a school-was not an economic activity. In
Morrison, the Court stressed that, in all its Commerce Clause decisions
utilizing the "substantial effects" doctrine, the underlying activity was
economic in nature. 20 Althou~h the relevance of this fact was questioned by
Justice Breyer in his dissent, I a requirement that intrastate activity reached
under the "substantial effects" doctrine be economic in nature could be viewed
as a judicially administrable criterion by which the necessity of reaching such
activity pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause can be assessed,z2 In other
words, when Congress reaches inside a state to regulate or prohibit wholly
intrastate activities because of their effect on interstate commerce, requiring
that these activities be economic in nature provides some assurance that doing
so is a truly necessary means to effectuate the permissible end of regulating
interstate commerce.
In Raich, the government contended that the cultivation of cannabis was
economic in nature because it affects the illicit market in marijuana and
substitutes for a product available in the illegal market which Congress sought
to prohibit. 23 We strongly resisted this contention, arguing that if an activity
was economic simply because it substitutes for a market product or service or
because it affects an economic market, then any activity could be deemed to be
economic and the reason for the Court invoking the economic/noneconomic
distinction would be defeated.
19 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316,413 (1819) ("If reference be had to its use, in
the common affairs of the world, or in approved authors, we find that it frequently imports
no more than that one thing is convenient, or useful, or essential to another. ").
20 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611.
21 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 657 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[W]hy should we give
critical constitutional importance to the economic, or noneconomic, nature of an interstatecommerce-affecting cause?").
22 See 1. Randy Beck, The New Jurisprndence of the Necessary and Proper Clause,
2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 581, 625 (2002) ("[L]imiting Congress to the regulation of local
economic activity ensures that such regulations will, in most circumstances, be plainly
adapted and really calculated to achieve some legitimate end connected with the interstate
economy. ").
23 Brief for the Petitioners at 12, Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005) (No. 031454) ("Respondents' conduct is economic activity that is subject to congressional control
because it occurs in, and substantially affects, the marijuana market generally. Home-grown
marijuana displaces drugs sold in both the open drug market and the black drug market
regulated by the CSA."); id. at 37 ("[R]espondents' manufacturing, distribution, and
possession activities themselves 'involved economic activity' . . . [because they] are
producing a fungible commodity for which there is an established market and are doing so
for their own use when they would otherwise be participants in a regulated market.").
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Going forward, it is very important that the Court in Raich failed to rely
upon, or even mention, the government's sweeping theory of "economic."
Instead, the Court found the activity to be economic relying solely on a single
forty-year old dictionary definition. Here is what the majority says, in its
entirety:
Unlike those at issue in Lopez and Morrison, the activities regulated by
the CSA are quintessentially economic. "Economics" refers to "the
production, distribution, and consumption of commodities." Webster's
Third New International Dictionary 720 (1966). The CSA is a statute that
regulates the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities
for which there is an established, and lucrative, interstate market.
Prohibiting the intrastate possession or manufacture of an article of
commerce is a rational (and commonly utilized) means of regulating
commerce in that product. Such prohibitions include specific decisions
requiring that a drug be withdrawn from the market as a result of the
failure to comply with regulatory requirements as well as decisions
excluding Schedule I drugs entirely from the market. Because the CSA is
a statute that directly regulates economic, commercial activity, our
opinion in Morrison casts no doubt on its constitutionality?4
As Justice O'Connor observed,25 no explanation was given for why this
particularly broad definition was chosen over several other more narrow
definitions. Broad as it is, however, the definition used by the Court is
considerably narrower than the theory urged upon it by the government, and the
Court's definition of "economic" is far from unlimited. It would exclude any
personal conduct that does not involve "the production, distribution, and
consumption of commodities." Reading a book, for example, or having sex. So
too, most violent crimes, such as the one at issue in Morrison, do not involve
the production, distribution, or consumption of commodities. As a result, much
law that is within the traditional police power of states lies outside this
definition of economic, which (according to Morrison) cannot be aggregated
for purposes of finding a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
Having said this, the Court's declared definition of "economic" is indeed
exceedingly broad. A future Court, however, could narrow it in one of two
ways. First, a court could decline to consider this single archaic dictionary
definition as dispositive. Second, a court could treat the Court's analysis of
"economic" activities as dicta in light of its primary reliance upon the "larger
regulatory scheme" doctrine that permits Congress to reach noneconomIC
activity.
It is potentially significant that the Court's proposed definition of
"economic" came in its effort to distinguish Morrison in Part IV of its opinion,
not in its affirmative defense of the constitutionality of the statute in Part III
which seems more clearly to echo the "larger regulatory scheme" rationale that
was, after all, rooted in Lopez itself. Because the "larger regulatory scheme"
rationale allows Congress to reach some noneconomic behavior, its effort to

24

25

Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195,2211 (2005) (footnote omitted).
Id. at 2224-25 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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further distinguish Morrison via its unwarranted definition of "economic" was
unnecessary to decide the case, and therefore was dicta. 26 Perhaps the spirit of
Morrison is alive after all.
CONCLUSION

Raich looms large now because it came as such a disappointment to those
who admired Lopez and Morrison and hoped these cases presaged a broader
New Federalism revolution. But as it recedes into the past, a Court seeking to
limit the powers of Congress could resume movement in that direction by a
series of baby steps before needing to confront Raich head on. If and when it
does, the "doctrine" established by the Court in Raich will seem remarkably
narrow, fragile, and easy to distinguish or subtly modify. Indeed, limiting Raich
will be far easier for the Court than was any limitation in Raich of Lopez and
Morrison-cases that the Court took pains to leave in place despite the hostility
towards them shared by at least four of the justices in the majority.
The happy little secret of the two hundred year history of the Commerce
Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause is that no Supreme Court-not the
Marshall Court or even the New Deal Court-has had the guts to say out loud
that there are no judicially enforced limits on the powers of Congress under the
Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause and that, as a result, the
enumerated powers scheme is hereby judicially repealed. No Court has had the
gall to frankly admit it was amending the Constitution. Remember that even the
New Deal Court held Wickard over for reargument to the following year and
declined to issue an opinion that would have ceded all discretion to Congress to
defme the limits of its powers.27 Federalism lives as a "first principle" of
constitutional law because no Court has had the temerity to kill it outright. And
if the New Deal Court could not take that step, neither will a future Court.
Provided, of course, that those who value federalism fight to keep it alive inside
and outside of the courts despite setbacks of the sort represented by Gonzales v.
Raich.

26 On the other hand, the Court's explicit discussions of the "larger regulatory scheme"
doctrine and the definition of "economic" both appear in Part IV of its opinion. See Raich,
125 S. Ct. at 2210-11. The argument in the text that the Court's expansive definition of
"economic" activity is dicta depends on characterizing its primary argument for the statute's
constitutionality in Part III as more closely reflecting the "larger regulatory scheme" doctrine
it later explicitly discusses in Part IV.
27 See BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHlNKING THE NEW DEAL COURT 218 (1998) (describing
Justice Jackson's flirtation with an opinion containing, in Jackson's words, a "frank holding
that the interstate commerce power has no limits except those which Congress sees fit to
observe ... ").
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